South Africa has very high unemployment, yet few adults work informally in small …rms. One explanation is that unions extend arbitration decisions to non-unionized …rms, raising wages. These agreements are enforced in a spatially discontinuous way; employment e¤ects of these bargaining councils are identi…ed through spatial …xed effects. This approach represents a methodological improvement over sample restrictions used in other spatial discontinuity studies. Bargaining councils are found to decrease employment by 6-11%, with larger decreases among small …rms. These e¤ects are not explained by resettlement to uncovered areas, and are robust to a wide variety of forms for average spatial heterogeneity.
Introduction
In determining the optimal level of worker protection, governments face a tradeo¤ between higher wages and better bene…ts for workers, and lower employment rates if the marginal cost of labor increases. If labor protection is extended to small …rms with presumably low levels of capital and labor productivities, employment e¤ects and entreprenuerial disincentives may be strong, suggesting that labor protection policies may have an e¤ect not only on employment levels but on the distribution of …rm sizes. Of course, the ultimate e¤ect of any set of arbitration decisions or government policies is an empirical question, and the University of California, Berkeley. I thank Guojun He and Charles Seguin for excellent research assistance and John Bellows for alerting me to some of the data used in this study. I also thank Michael Anderson, Lori Beaman, Tim Conley, Ann Harrison, Paul Schultz, Chris Udry and seminar audiences at Berkeley, USC, UCSD, and the World Bank for many helpful comments. All remaining mistakes are naturally my own.
challenge posed to the empirical economist is to identify an adequate control group of regions or industries which would have experienced similar employment outcomes were it not for di¤erential exposure to labor regulations.
While the tension between worker protection and employment opportunities is one that virtually every government faces, the case for a reconsideration of policy is made particularly frequently and it's consequences may be particularly severe in South Africa. In South Africa, much of the labor force is unionized. Wages are high for a country of its level of economic development. While not mandated, employer organizations and unions may opt to participate in bargaining councils, which extend arbitration agreements beyond the …rms and unions which make them to all workers in an industry in a given political demarcation, regardless of …rm size or participation in the arbitration process. Whether these agreements reduce employment, particularly in small …rms, has been extensively debated. The immediacy of this debate is heightened by South Africa's severe and peculiar employment situation, where unemployment is extremely high (at 20-40% for prime-age adults), with long durations being common. Despite the shortage of formal employment opportunities, few individuals either start their own …rms or work for small …rms, informal or otherwise.
Other potential motivations for South Africa's unemployment without entrepreneurship abound. For example, high wages and an extensive social safety net may increase the demand for leisure or render long periods of unemployed search more palatable. Entrepreneurial opportunities may be limited by low skill levels, liquidity constraints, and high crime, while high capital stocks may make large …rms competitive with relatively low labor inputs. Identifying the e¤ects of labor regulations, therefore, requires a careful analysis which would hold these conditions constant. This challenge, combined with a previous lack of available data on these agreements, has prevented clean estimates of the impact of bargaining council agreements on employment or industrial structure. As an additional challenge, these agreements are outcomes of a complex bargaining process between unions and …rms with unclear and likely anti-competitive motives. Since centralized bargaining is not mandated, the …rms which choose to pursue centralized bargaining may be those whose local labor market conditions are such that centralized bargaining would represent a large competitive advantage. Therefore, the identi…cation assumptions of similarity in level, trend, or response to a bargaining council agreement which would be necessary for a simple OLS or di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach may not hold in practice.
However, local labor markets are spatially continuous across the intranational political boundaries in South Africa, while these agreements are enforced in a spatially discontinuous way. In fact, this context is near-ideal for spatial discontinuity, as agreements vary with space, across industries, and over time, creating enough policy groups to avoid the common error-component problems which have plagued existing labor regulation studies. This paper creates a database of industrial bargaining agreements and adopts the spatial …xed e¤ects proposed in Conley and Udry (2008) and Goldstein and Udry (2008) , and argues that this spatial-…xed-e¤ects approach represents an improvement over restricting samples to border areas, which is used in previous spatial regression discontinuity estimations. This spatial discontinuity reveals large e¤ects: industries which have an agreement in a particular town in a given year have about 8-14% lower employment and 10-21% higher wages then the same industry in uncovered neighboring towns. Firm sizes are also impacted, with 7-15% fewer employees in small …rms, and 7-12% fewer entrepreneurs, while there are smaller and insigni…cant e¤ects on large …rms and single employee …rms. Utilizing town-year and townindustry …xed e¤ects, I illustrate that these spatial discontinuities are similar in magnitude and precision whether inter-industry variation (within a town-year) or intertemporal variation (within a town-industry) is utilized. I further illustrate that, while both large and small …rms move across borders in order to avoid these agreements, this border-jumping does not drive the employment e¤ects measured here, so that these reductions in employment represent a net loss for the economy. Finally, I introduce weighted spatial …xed e¤ects to test the robustness of estimates to a wide variety of potential spatial heterogeneities, and …nd that estimates are quite robust.
South Africa' s Missing Small Firms
Unemployment in South Africa is extremely high, particularly among non-whites. Table   1 reports data from the 2003 Labour force survey (described below), which indicates that only about 50% of 20-60 year old African men and 35% of 20-60 year old African women are actually working, while 20-44% of each group is unemployed, depending on whether the broad or narrow measure is utilized. Kingdon and Knight (2006) advocate the broad unemployment measure in this context, as local wages are more sensitive to that measure.
A large number of potential reasons for this unemployment exist, and the unemployment numbers and potential contributors for them are surveyed more extensively in a series of papers by Kingdon and Knight (e.g. 2004 , 2008 as well as Banerjee et al (2008) .
Wages are high, due to high capital/labor ratios, a strong union presence, and extensive governmental labor market regulation in addition to the industrial bargaining agreements which are the focus of this paper (e.g. Butcher and Rouse 2000, Schultz and Mwabu 1998) .
Second, entrepreneurial skills may be absent in the population, as informal employment was squashed under Apartheid (e.g. Kingdon and Knight 2004) . Third, some unemployment may be voluntary; a generous non-contributory pension program combined with the high wages earned by the employed leave many unemployed individuals with networks capable of supporting them (e.g. Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 2003 for labor supply e¤ects; Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller 2005 for network e¤ects of pensions on living arrangements).
While it is clear that many adults are unemployed in South Africa, and there are a variety of potential motivations for this unemployment, it is unclear what adults are in fact doing.
Labor force surveys in South Africa go to great lengths to measure any economic activity, identifying as workers individuals who engage in unpaid household work or tend household plots "even for only one hour" in the past week; this approach yields the low employment numbers described above. A very natural response to this unemployment would be for many to be either self-employed or working informally
1 . Yet columns 5 and 6 of table 1 reveals that 1 This is particularly true as unemployment durations are very long, and there is some evidence that social only 5-6% of prime age black South Africans are self-employed. A number of women do work in domestic service, at around 8% of the female population, which may similarly represent entrepreneurial activity. Nonetheless, these numbers are tiny compared to countries with similar levels of unemployment (e.g. Charmes 2000, Kingdon and Knight 2004) . Moreover, what is perhaps most striking is that there are relatively few employees of small …rms in general. Table 2 reports the percent of employees in each …rm size category in South Africa.
Particularly for men, we see very few workers in …rms of fewer than 5 employees. For comparison purposes, I also include similar data from the 1995-96 Brazillian LSMS survey 2 .
We see that, while unemployment is a great deal higher in South Africa (particularly for men), the distribution of …rm sizes looks fairly similar -with one big exception. What is missing in South Africa, compared to Brazil, are the small …rms with 2-4 employees.
Of the above explanations for high unemployment, one in particular which may suggest minimal small-scale employment in a high unemployment context is labor regulation. The South African labor market is highly regulated, with a variety of legislated labor standards as well as privately bargained arbitration decisions. Unlike in many other developing countries, South Africa is successful in enforcing labor and tax regulations on many small (and potentially informal) …rms; an in ‡uential study found that the average business with fewer than 5 employees pays nearly R14000 (about $2170) per employee in costs associated with tax and labor regulations 3 (SBP 2005) . Moreover, unions and …rms can extend labor standard arbitration to all workers in a given political district through bargaining councils. Small businesses, in particular, have advocated aggressively against the extension of these labor arbitration decisions; in 2005 South African President Thabo Mbeki announced that small connections may be important to …nd employment. Since jobs are scarce, job opportunities may be shared only among very close relations (Magruder 2008, Seekings and Nattrass 2005) , leaving individuals with poor social connections with very limited opportunities to …nd work. 2 It is not common for household surveys in developing countries to ask respondents about the size of the …rm they work for. Fortunately, the Brazillian LSMS is an exception. Brazil represents a particularly good comparison for South Africa as a country with a broadly similar income level and similarly extreme level of inequality.
3 This estimate is the average over complying and non-complying …rms. The greatest contributor to this estimated cost is VAT regulations, though labor regulations are also important. Of course, small business respondents to this survey may overstate compliance.
businesses would be granted a blanket exemption from these bargaining council agreements within the year in his state of the union address (Mbeki 2005) . However, under pressure from trade unions and employers organizations to the contrary, the government never enacted this blanket exemption (e.g. Cosatu Rejects 2005). The fact both that the government would consider a legal change to exempt small business and that it meant with strong opposition con…rms the anecdotal and survey evidence that these regulations are enforceable.
The potential of labor regulations to a¤ect employment has been extensively explored in economics; a summary of this literature through the late 1990s is available in Nickell and Layard (1999) . Much of the recent literature (e.g. Bertrand and Kramarz 2002 , Besley and Burgess 2004 , Harrison and Scorce 2008 ) has adopted a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach where a time series of data on the legislative environment in states is summarized by a before and after period. Di¤erence in employment trends between "treatment" states which adopt a policy and "control" states which do not are then compared to get an estimate of the e¤ect of the regulation on employment. A second approach is to utilize a spatial discontinuity (e.g. Holmes 1998; Dube, Lester, and Reich 2008) , where neighboring counties or states are compared, under the assumption that geographically proximate counties share similar labor markets and incentives to form labor policy, but are di¤erentially exposed.
Many existant labor regulation studies use a variation which adopts some elements of each of these approaches (e.g. Card and Krueger 1994) , so that changes in trends are compared across spatially proximate regions. The measure of each of these studies is how comparable of a control group can be developed without causing small sample problems; to determine which approach is best for South Africa will require a more careful description of the labor regulations to be studied.
Industrial Bargaining in South Africa
Unions in South Africa can bargain with employers in two primary ways. The 1995 Labor Relations Act codi…es the right of employers to form employers organizations for their particular industry and region and bargain with unions centrally; the labor standards which result from this bargaining can then be applied to all employees working in the industry and region which the bargaining council presides over. That is, if employer organizations and unions decide to bargain centrally, than all employees -regardless of their union status -who work within that geographical region will work under the agreed-upon labor standards. Unions and employers may also choose to bargain unilaterally, resulting in plant level agreements (Bendix 2001) . Both unilateral bargaining and centralized bargaining are observed in a wide variety of industries and areas in South Africa, so that di¤erent industries in the same location may be covered by di¤erent types of agreements, industries may be covered by unilateral agreements in some locations and centralized agreements in others, and industries in a particular location may be covered by centralized agreements in one year and not in another.
It is encoded in law that bargaining councils must be representative of …rms and employee unions in their jurisdiction; however, the extent to which this law is enforced is unclear. The o¢ cial wording is that councils must be "su¢ ciently" representative, leading to a great deal of magisterial power and contention (primarily from small employers) as to whether the agreements represent all interests (Bendix 2001) . South Africa's political structure is that about 350 magisterial districts are organized into one of 52 District Councils; these in turn comprise 9 provinces. In principle, there is not a strict criteria over which groupings of magisterial districts can form a bargaining council; in practice, most bargaining councils represent collections of magisterial districts which map to political boundaries, either national, provincial, or at the District Council level. In the model below, I follow the empirical trend in presuming that other magisterial districts within the district council are the natural bargaining partners in determining whether to form a bargaining council agreement.
Existing studies on the e¤ects of arbitration on wages and unemployment in South Africa have imperfect information on the presence of bargaining council agreements and treat the endogeneity of union membership via industry and occupational …xed e¤ects, which may be an imperfect control; these studies …nd that unions receive very high wage premia, particularly at the bottom of the income distribution (Schultz and Mwabu 1998) , and that bargaining councils exhibit a smaller, though still present, wage premium (Butcher and Rouse 2001) . However, since the right to bargain centrally is one which must be exercized voluntarily, we may be concerned that bargaining council agreements exist systematically in the industries, towns, and years in which local labor markets make them particularly pro…table for the …rms which push for the bargaining agreement. Moll (1996) outlines a theoretical model illustrating how larger, more capital-intensive …rms may prefer the centralized bargaining structure as it obliges smaller, more labor intensive …rms to pay similar wages and reduces competition. More speci…cally, we may imagine that there are three types of …rms: Large Unionized Firms, Large non-Unionized Firms, and Small Firms. In the absence of a bargaining council agreement, large unionized …rms pay privately bargained wages w U , while large non-unionized …rms and small …rms pay market wages (w ). Under a bargaining council agreement, all would pay the same bargaining council wage w BC ; following Moll (1996) in presuming that w U > w BC > w , it is clear that operating costs decrease for large unionized …rms and increase for small …rms and large non-unionized …rms in the presence of a bargaining council agreement. Thus, large unionized …rms have a direct incentive to advocate for a bargaining council agreement, as their wages may go down, while small …rms and large non-unionized …rms have a direct incentive to advocate against such an agreement. As the relative supply curves for the three types of …rms shift, equilibrium changes as well. If small …rms have the lowest marginal products of labor (due to low capital stocks), we may imagine that their supply curve shifts in by the largest margin, resulting in an increase in the residual demand faced by the two types of large …rms. Thus, large unionized …rms bene…t from less competition from small …rms and lower wages, large non-unionized …rms bene…t from less competition from small …rms but su¤er from higher wages, and small …rms lose by the greatest margins. The degree of these bene…ts, and the degree to which small …rms and large non-unionized …rms are punished by the bargaining council agreement, are functions of local demand, local labor supply, production technologies at each …rm size, and other local labor market characteristics, as the changes in the demand faced by each type of …rm will depend on anything which in ‡uences local supply and demand curves. In a simple model presented in an appendix on the author's website, I
show more formally that, in equilibrium, large unionized …rms will increase employment in response to a bargaining council agreement, while large non-unionized …rms and small …rms will decrease employment.
The di¤ering pro…t incentives that employers face, outlined above, are clear. Therefore, the presence of a bargaining council agreement will clearly be related to some aggregation of the private incentives of large …rms 4 . However, unions could adopt a bargaining position which is more or less hostile to bargaining councils, so the decision to pursue centralized bargaining may be an optimization not only of …rms but also of unions. Most of South Africa's unions are aggregated into three large alliances which are important political entities. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest union alliance in South Africa, o¢ cially supports centralized bargaining council agreements for their e¤ects on transforming labor standards, though both COSATU and NACTU, the National Council of Trade Unions (another large union alliance), have a history of also bargaining at the plant level (Bendix 2001) . Both COSATU's o¢ cial positions on bargaining council agreements and the discussion of commentators (e.g. Bendix 2001 ) suggest that unions have some support for these agreements due to the greater political support they receive from advocating for globally higher labor standards. We may also imagine that unions have varying incentives related to local labor market heterogeneity, for example, the amount of dues which can be received or local competition from uncovered workers. Here, I simply model the union's role in bargaining as a cost C of adopting the bargaining council agreement, though empirical analysis will be robust to heterogeneity in local labor markets and, in some speci…cations, the political value of a given town in a given year.
Suppose that, in the absence of a bargaining council agreement, large unionized …rms in town t earn pro…ts U t , and that large non-unionized …rms earn t : Further suppose that all large …rms each earn pro…ts BC t in the presence of a bargaining council agreement before paying cost C to the union, and that fraction t of the total Q t large …rms in town t are unionized. A bargaining council agreement is a collective result of the preferences of large …rms throughout a district council, thus, if town t belongs to district council DC; bargaining council legislation is adopted if
Local labor demand, local labor supply, local production technologies, local unionization rates, and local product demand all determine the result of this relationship. We should expect to see bargaining councils in places where the majority of large …rms would bene…t from having a bargaining council -that is, places where prices would either increase a lot from a reduction in small …rm production, where small …rm production would decrease substantially from the presence of a bargaining council agreement, or where a large reduction in wages for unionized large …rms may take place. In places where small …rm production technologies are relatively ine¢ cient, and large …rms face little competition, the incentives to form a bargaining council agreement are weakened, while in places with a vibrant small …rms sector, the incentives to enforce uniform wages may be high. Any econometric investigation into the e¤ect of bargaining councils on employment and small …rm employment would have to take these factors into account 5 .
The focus of this paper will be on estimating employment e¤ects, small …rm employment e¤ects, and wage e¤ects of bargaining councils. That is, I want to estimate
where Y ity may be employment, or employment by …rm size in industry i in town t during year y, or it may be some measure of wages in that industry-town-year; BC ity denotes the presence of a bargaining council agreement, and X ity are covariates including population.
The model above suggests that the presence of a bargaining council agreement is related to many characteristics of local labor markets, including labor supply, small …rm production technologies, etc. These are captured in ity ; which is unobserved and may be correlated with BC ity and other explanatory variables. As such, the presence of a bargaining council agreement is an endogenous variable, and simple OLS estimates of this equation are likely to be biased.
To solve this endogeneity problem, I note that labor supply, production technologies, and other characteristics of local labor markets within a given industry are likely to be spatially continuous, so long as migration and trade are locally feasible. Formally, let R (t)
denote the set of all towns within radius R of town t; Z ity be the vector [X ity ; BC ity ; i ; y ]
and Z iR(t)y denote the vector of Z it 0 y ; 8t 0 2 R (t) : Then, spatial continuity suggests that E ity jZ iR(t)y = E it 0 y jZ iR(t)y for R su¢ ciently small and t 0 2 R (t). This assumption is identical to that made in standard regression discontinuity designs, which motivates the empirical strategy below.
Potential deviations from spatial continuity, and adjustments which should be robust to them, are discussed in section 4.1, below.
Spatial Regression Discontinuity
Spatial discontinuity analysis in economics has largely followed Card and Krueger (1994) who use Eastern Pennsylvanians as a control group for New Jersey residents. Card and Krueger estimate the e¤ect of a change in minimum wage laws through a di¤erence in di¤erence -under the assumption that Eastern Pennsylvanians are similar to New Jerseyans, changes in employment rates of New Jerseyans should be similar to that of Eastern Pennsylvanians, except because of the di¤erential changes in minimum wage laws. Other papers have followed this approach in restricting analysis to individuals who live near the border of states or countries which enact particular laws; for example, Holmes (1998) compares manufacturing production in counties just north of "right-to-work" states to those just south of the border, …nding large e¤ects which quickly diminish with distance from the border.
The approach of restricting analyses to border regions is appealing as the spatial discontinuity is transparent -towns on one side of the border are presumably similar to those on the opposite side. However, there are several limitations to analysis of this sort. First, restricting samples to border areas in practice reduces space from having two dimensions to having just a single one. A border analysis not only compares individuals, towns, or counties to proximate ones, it compares all towns on one side of the boundary to all towns on the other. If the border is long, this may in e¤ect cause some pairs of towns which are geographically distant to represent a control-treatment di¤erence. These towns need not be proximate, and while using border-region …xed e¤ects can eliminate some of this heterogeneity, it remains an imperfect approach as it introduces a discontinuity into continuous space 6 .
Secondly, we throw away a lot of information when we restrict the sample to border towns.
Restricting the sample to border regions is analogous to cutting the sample to observations within a small bandwidth of the discontinuity in the running variable in a more standard regression discontinuity. However, just as in a more standard RD, this eliminates the potential of more distant observations to inform on the relationships between other covariates and the dependent variable. If we are studying employment, the most important of these is likely to be population, as larger cities mechanically employ more people. Observations which are distant from the border can help us identify the relationship between population and employment, while allowing the e¤ect of space to remain fairly unparametized. This is analogous to allowing the relationship between the running variable and the dependent variable to be ‡exible away from the eligibility cuto¤, but still using the observations which are more distant from the cuto¤ to learn about covariates.
This paper adopts the spatial …xed e¤ects suggested in Conley and Udry (2008) and Goldstein and Udry (2008) . In both of these papers, these spatial …xed e¤ects are used to control for unobserved soil quality variation which is presumed to be similar amongst nearby plots. The idea of this approach is identical to the standard …xed e¤ects approach. For each observation, we can subtract o¤ the mean of observations which are spatially proximate.
Using spatial …xed e¤ects, we have
where n R(t) represents the number of towns in R (t) and~ t and" it similarly represent spatial deviations. By assumption, E it 0 y jZ iR(t)y = E ity jZ iR(t)y for t 0 2 R (t) : That is, this di¤erencing removes the endogeneity contained in the ity : We presumed earlier that u ity was unrelated to BC ity and X ity (as endogeneity was summarized by ity ). If we extend that so that u ity is strictly exogenous, i.e. u ity ? Z iR(t)y , then this within estimator will consistently estimate 1 and :
This identi…cation is valid under the assumption that the incentive to form bargaining councils, modeled above as a collection of characteristics of local labor markets, is spatially continuous. Identi…cation is by spatial discontinuity: outcomes are compared only against those of proximate neighbors as are program status and covariates. This equation estimates whether, if your bargaining council status is greater than your neighbors'(i.e. you live on the bargaining council-side of a border), you have more employment than your neighbors.
For interior magisterial districts, the spatial deviation is zero, but the employment e¤ects of di¤erences in population and time trends can still be estimated using the interior variation 7 .
The anologous approach in more standard regression discontinuity is to examine di¤erences in the dependent variable that exist only within a small bandwidth of the eligibility threshold, while allowing the eligibility-determining variable to have a non-parametric e¤ect more generally.
Finally, while theory may tell us that local labor markets should be spatially continuous, it o¤ers few predictions as to the rate at which spatial similarity dissipates. Fortunately, spatial …xed e¤ects allow an easy test to determine whether estimated e¤ects are robust to a wide variety of assumptions on average spatial heterogeneity. In particular, rather than equally weighting all observations within radius R to determine spatial means, we can allow a weighted spatial mean, where observations within di¤erent radii are weighted di¤erently. Then, we can examine simultaneously which choice of weights would lead to similar point estimates and statistical tests, as well as examining which choice of weights best describes the spatial heterogeneity in the data in a sum of squared deviations sense.
In the spatial heterogeneity robustness section below, I describe these weighted spatial …xed e¤ects (WSFE), and illustrate robustness to a wide variety of spatial weighting schemes.
Is Spatial Discontinuity Su¢ cient?
Several concerns about the spatial discontinuity identi…cation in this context demand further consideration. First, as mentioned above, Bargaining Council Agreements usually apply to all magisterial districts which belong to a larger political entity, either a District Council, Province, or the entire nation. However, in a few cases individual magisterial districts are added or subtracted from these groups in the coverage of a bargaining council (usually either the biggest town or closest neighbors of an adjoining district council). Though these observations represent a small share of the data, we may still worry about the implications of these observations for analysis. This is somewhat a problem for spatial discontinuityif bargaining councils are choosing precisely where the boundary of coverage should stop, we may worry that the industry-speci…c labor markets are indeed discontinuous at those coverage di¤erences in an important way. In fact, this problem is directly analogous to the problem of imperfect enforcement and incomplete take-up in more traditional regression discontinuity. Traditional regression discontinuity avoids the problem of endogenous takeup by instrumenting program receipt with program eligibility. I follow this approach in this paper: I describe a magisterial district-industry-year observation as eligible for the program if it belongs to a district council where at least one magisterial district has a bargaining council agreement in that industry-year and use that measure of eligibility as an instrument for program receipt. All …rst stages are extremely strong; the minimum t-statistic of bargaining council eligibility on bargaining council status across speci…cations and samples is 9.9.
Second, spatial …xed e¤ects may imperfectly control for characteristics of local labor markets. This may be true because great circle distances are imperfect measures of true economic distance. For example, travel times may be large between two physically proximate towns due either to poor infrastructure or rugged terrain, or other labor regulations may vary discontinuously at political boundaries. Moreover, local labor markets may change over time in ways correlated with regulation (e.g. Dube, Lester, and Reich 2008) . It is also possible that industry-speci…c labor markets relate to geography in di¤erent ways. To deal with these two concerns, I repeat all analysis both with town-year and town-industry …xed e¤ects. Townyear …xed e¤ects compare across industries within the same town and year, and in doing so control for any ways in which the town is di¤erent from its spatially proximate neighbors that year, including ways in which that town may be politically valuable to the union alliance, the possibility that local neighbors are in fact distinct labor markets due to geographical separation or legislation (presuming that all industries are similarly e¤ected by the long travel times or other disruptions to spatial continuity), or the possibility of secular local time trends which e¤ect all industries. Town-industry …xed e¤ects examine how employment changes when bargaining council agreements are added or expire, and so control for any ways in which that industry's local labor market di¤ers from its spatially proximate neighbors which is constant over time 8 . These represent very di¤erent identi…cation assumptions, and the similarity of results under these two approaches is additional evidence that the true model is the hypothesized one.
However, we may remain concerned that labor markets for a particular industry may vary discontinuously and change endogenously over time with bargaining council agreements. As such, I propose the following: Equation 1 makes clear that the presence of a bargaining council is due to some collaboration of towns in the same political district. If local labor markets are relatively continuous, then nearby towns should have similar incentives to form a bargaining council and the spatial …xed e¤ects approach solves the endogeneity problem.
If they aren't, then it indicates that something about industry i in town t is di¤erent from industry i in neighboring towns. If town t has much lower employment than other towns in its District Council, then, as equation 1 makes explicit, town t 0 s preferences should not be strongly re ‡ected in the presence or absence of a bargaining agreement. In particular, if town t is discontinuously di¤erent from its political neighbors in its incentive to form a bargaining council, than it will not be able to enact its optimal choice. As such, our concern for endogeneity is minimized. However, if a dominate share of industry i is located in town t; then this concern may remain, and the presence of a bargaining council in town t's district council may be a re ‡ection of discontinuous labor market trends in town t: I repeat all estimation with a sample of industries and towns where employment is no more than 20%
of employment in that industry in that district council on average.
Finally, two potential sources of non-independence among observations are well-known and relevant to this context. A …rst challenge to evaluating programs which are implemented at aggregate levels is that if individuals in a political district have correlated error terms, or there is autocorrelation in the error, then OLS produces inconsistent standard errors (Bertrand et al 2004) . The standard solution is to cluster at the policy group level. Since bargaining councils vary on the district council-industry level 9 (there are 208 district councilindustry groups and 52 district councils in the estimation sample), this context avoids the small group number concerns which have challenged some past studies of governmental policies (e.g. Donald and Lang 2007) . Secondly, it seems likely that the error term may be spatially autocorrelated (Conley 1999) . Of course, the group of towns which are physically proximate is similar to the group which are politically proximate; however, as identi…cation 9 Several of the bargaining councils extend agreements to entire provinces, while others operate only on the District Council level (and a small fraction operate for even smaller units). This makes it di¢ cult to know, for certain, how to categorize observations (particularly for industries and towns which are not covered by a bargaining council agreement). The results presented here presume that, since some District Councils unilaterally receive bargaining councils, this is the true observation level (implicitly, this assumes that bargaining councils which exist react to considerations at the District Council level). An alternate assumption would be to assume that the observation unit is the province-industry level. Results which make this assumption and cluster simultaneously at the spatial-industry, province-industry, and town level are similar and available from the author. rests on the di¤erence between these two groups, it is desirable to construct standard errors which are robust to correlation amongst both of them. This paper allows observations to be related if either they are close spatially or in the same district council. This is the more computationally intensive procedure outlined in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) , and also a special case of the Conley (1999) spatial errors if "economic distance" is de…ned as equal amongst individuals who live either within a given physical distance or a political demarcation. identi…ers not remaining consistent from wave to wave. As such, I aggregate data to the magisterial district level and use it as a panel at that level. These data are not intended to be representative at the magisterial district level and are not publicly released at that level to prevent mistaken inference (on, for example, the extent of the variation in employment in a particular town year to year). This concern, however, should not limit more robust econometric analysis, so long as the degree to which the data are not representative is unrelated to the variables of interest and local-level unobservable heterogeneity is properly controlled for. While magisterial district identi…ers are not released, they can be inferred from personal identi…cation codes. These identi…ers remain unchanged since at least the 1997 October Household Survey, which published an association between number and local municipality names 10 . From this list, I determine the magisterial district of each sampling area, and determine the longitude and latitude for the population center of that magisterial 10 Examining characteristics of magisterial districts between these two surveys reassures that the identi…ers are in fact unchanged.
Data
district. The unit of analysis in this paper will thus be the magisterial district; since sampling weights are not designed to be representative at this level I do not use them. Therefore, I measure employment in a given industry in a given town as the number of people surveyed in that town who work in that industry 11 . We may be concerned that very large towns have di¤erent labor markets from their neighbors, and that we get little useful information out of small towns where relatively few individuals were surveyed. I exclude the top and bottom two percent of towns in terms of population from the analysis. Summary statistics of the variables which will be used are included in table 3.
The presence of bargaining council agreements in a given year is revealed by the South African Government Gazette, which publishes all agreements. A database compiled by the author reveals which industries in which magisterial districts were covered by an agreement at each year. This yields the outcome that 12 two-digit industries in South Africa are covered by bargaining council agreements for at least some of the sample period. Of these, 7 industries show at least cross-sectional variation in their coverage across the district councils of South
Africa. All in all, 22% of prime-age African and Coloured workers in South Africa work in two-digit industries where, in their district council, some workers are covered by a bargaining council agreement 12 . Di¤erent industries have di¤erent minimum e¤ective scales, limiting the potential for entrepreneurship in some industries. Table 4 reveals that 82.5% of the primeage African and Coloured self-employed in South Africa work in two-digit industries which at least sometimes have bargaining councils -this suggests that these councils are being utilized more in industries where small scale …rms are economically viable. In contrast, only about 40% of workers overall are working in these industries. Looking within industries which at 11 In a related point, it is not immediately obvious how to treat observations of 0 employment in some category in a particular town (of which there are many). On the one hand, these observations give useful and important variation -if bargaining councils are brutally e¤ective, we may expect to see 0 small …rm employees in a particular town-industry. On the other hand, when I (ultimately) take log+1 as a measure of employment, the log operator strongly emphasizes observations which are 0. This concern is lessened by the use of the simple count data rather than weighted counts -the di¤erence between log(1) and log(301) is a lot more than the di¤erence between log(0) and log(1). I also present results using the fraction of the population who are employed, which does not weight zeros as strongly. 12 The actual number of covered workers is probably lower, due to the aggregation at the 2 digit level. Aggregation challenges are addressed below. In principle, this bias should result in conservative estimates due to measurement error, since the bargaining council agreements only cover a fraction of the workers in the two-digit industry. Two of the industries with variation end up in "other" categories. We might worry that these categories are more heterogeneous than other two-digit designations, and that the bargaining councils represented (hairdressing, laundry services, and contract cleaning) represent a smaller fraction of the workers in the "other services" and "other business activities" industries. Additionally, a third industry (electrical manufacturing) is very small in scale (with only 25 small …rms employees measured in South Africa across the 4 survey years considered here), and covered almost everywhere. I exclude these three industries in the analysis below, although similar analysis including these industries is available from the author.
6 Results I present …rst results for which spatial heterogeneity has not been corrected for comparability with earlier studies. Speci…cally, I estimate Y ity = + BC ity + X ity + i + y + " ity where i and y represent industry and year level …xed e¤ects, respectively, and X ity includes a quartic in log population. Y ity variables include employment, large …rm employment, self employment, and small …rm employment (small …rms are de…ned to be …rms with fewer than 10 employees while large …rms have more than 20), both measured as log (X+1) as well as by the ratio of each of variable to the population. I perform two types of unadjusted estimations here: simple OLS and a di¤erence in di¤erence speci…cation, which conditions on District Council-Industry …xed e¤ects; results are reported in table 6. I present results for both the full sample and the sample of observations who are no more than 20% of that industry's employment in their district council. All cells report the coe¢ cient on bargaining council presence for a given sample and dependent variable. Across the board, the pooled OLS reveals that bargaining council agreements exist in towns that, if anything, have more employment in that industry. Even columns report the di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, which conditions on district council-industry …xed e¤ects (as the policy variable is determined at the district council level). Here, e¤ects are negative and signi…cant in both samples, revealing that, as bargaining council agreements come into place, employment decreases by 7 %, as does small …rm employment. Self employment appears to decrease by about 5%. Recall that our concerns over endogeneity were smaller for the town-industries which are too small to play a strong role in bargaining council status. A di¤erence in difference over these towns (presented in column 4), reveals that employment and small …rm employment are declining by 12-14%. However, we may be concerned that bargaining council agreements are being adopted or eliminated endogenously in places with speci…c time trends in employment or small …rm employment. In the analysis that follows, I utilize spatial …xed e¤ects to control for this endogeneity and achieve identi…cation through spatial discontinuity. Table 7 reports the coe¢ cients on the presence of a bargaining council agreement on employment from several spatially di¤erenced estimations, where the estimation equation is the instrumental variables analogue of equation 3, and spatial deviations in bargaining council status are instrumented by spatial deviations in bargaining council eligibility. In all equations, the spatial …xed e¤ect is taken at the 30-mile radius, so that each dependent and independent variable represents deviations of variables between the observation of interest and other observations in the same industry and within 30 miles, where distance is determined by the great circle method. All estimations are conditional on a quartic in log population and time …xed e¤ects, and all errors are clustered among observations across all years of the same industry within 2 degrees of latitude or longitude, as well as among all industries, towns, and years in the same district council. The …rst two columns report the e¤ects of a bargaining council agreement on log employment. Having a bargaining council agreement is not strongly associated with changes in log employment in the …rst row; once town-speci…c, town-year, or town-industry …xed e¤ects are included, the estimate of the bargaining council e¤ect becomes about 8-11%, and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. These coe¢ cients are quite stable despite the very di¤erent identi…cation assumptions: whether we look across industries at spatial deviations in employment, or across time within industries, we draw very similar inferences about the e¤ect of bargaining councils. In general, the speci…cations in column three, which takes as the dependent variable the percentage of the population employed in a particular industry, are more precisely estimated,with bargaining councils reducing the fraction of the population employed in a particular two digit industry by 2-4 tenths of a percentage point.
Employment Results
As discussed in the identi…cation section, we may worry about the identi…cation assumption of spatial continuity for town-industry observations which are extremely important within the district council, as these towns have the capacity to uniquely determine bargaining council status. However, in towns which represent a relatively small share of that industry's District Council employment, even if their incentives to form a bargaining council are radically di¤erent from their neighbors, their wishes for bargaining council status are unlikely to be implemented. For this group, there are even greater incentives to believe in the validity of the spatial discontinuity approach, and the even columns of table 7 implement this procedure using only these observations. Here, despite the smaller sample, precision increases and point estimates rise. Among town-industry groups which are too small to independently e¤ect bargaining council policy, we see employment fall by 11-14% relative to neighbors and other industries or other years within the town 13 .
Wage Results
Of course, the stated purpose of the bargaining council legislation is to improve working conditions rather then reduce employment. We can also ask if wages increase with bargaining council agreements. This analysis uses the subsample with at least one wage observation, which eliminates zero employment towns (and some with non-response to the wage question).
One consequence of the smaller sample is that the 30 mile radius, in conjunction with various town-speci…c heterogeneity loses a lot of power; column 1 of table 8 indicates that we …nd a 10-21% e¤ect on wages at this radius, though standard errors become large and the e¤ect loses statistical sign…cance as we consider town-year or town-industry …xed e¤ects. Column 2 repeats the analysis with a wider 50 mile spatial radius for the spatial …xed e¤ects; at this larger radius the town-year e¤ects regain precision. Overall, industries represented by a bargaining council in a town have 21% higher mean wages than the same industry in neighboring towns, and 13% higher wages if we hold constant mean deviations across industries in that year. Since the wage data appear not to be su¢ ciently dense for a 30 mile radius with town-year heterogeneity, I report the following wage and worker characteristic regressions using the 50-mile spatial …xed e¤ects (30 mile radii give similar, but sometimes less precise, point estimates and are available from the author). The motivation above suggested that small …rms should see larger wage increases than large …rms, as large …rms often must pay union wages anyway. We can examine mean log wages for small …rms (with fewer than 10 employees) and large …rms (with more than 20) separately, in columns 3 and 4. Consistent with theory, wages in small …rms are rising substantially, with (precisely measured) point estimates around 12-18%. In contrast, large …rm wages are if anything decreasing in response to bargaining councils, consistent with the hypothesis that bargaining council wages are lower than privately bargained ones (though errors are too large to reject a null hypothesis of a zero e¤ect). However, caution must be taken in interpreting wage estimates as a change in wages for individual workers, because the composition of employees is changing. Table 9 tests the importance of worker composition e¤ects. Column 1 reports wage estimates when we control for the fraction male, the average number of years of primary and secondary education, and a quadratic in average potential experience (age -education -six).
We see that controlling for these observable characteristics attenuates the e¤ect of bargaining councils on wages somewhat, with estimated e¤ects dropping by 4 to 5 percentage points in each speci…cation. Columns 2 through 4 looks at how each of these variables changes with bargaining council status, and we observe that the big di¤erence is in the gender of employees.
When a bargaining council is present in an industry, the fraction of the labor force which is male increases by 5 to 13 percentage points. Education and age of the labor force are not robustly associated with bargaining council status. The education result is consistent with other studies (e.g. Magruder 2008) which …nd that education is not a strong predictor of employment in South Africa. However, the age result is on surface somewhat surprising, as labor standards in these bargaining council agreements include hiring and …ring regulations as well as wage standards. In a high unemployment context, age is a poor proxy for tenure, which we might expect to increase in the presence of hiring and …ring restrictions. We can directly investigate the e¤ect of bargaining council agreements on tenure; this requires using the sub-sample which responded to the tenure question. In column 5, I report the e¤ect of bargaining councils on mean log tenure at the plant. Mean tenures are increasing by about 18-19% in response to bargaining council regulations 14 .
Firm Size Results
Here, I divide …rms into four groups: large …rms, with at least 20 employees; small …rms, with fewer than 10 employees; self-employment, and single-worker …rms. Many self-employed individuals thus are also represented in the small …rms and the single-worker …rms categories.
From the model above, we expect the bargaining councils to have the largest e¤ects on employment in small …rms. Large …rm employment should have, in principal, an ambiguous e¤ect, and the e¤ect on self employment will depend on how many entrepreneurs run larger small …rms and the enforcement capacity of the bargaining council. If most single-employee …rms aspire to grow to multiple employees, or if single employees are themselves paid a wage, it may be that bargaining council legislation reduces employment in single-employee …rms.
However, since most single employee …rms are owner-operated, it seems likely that singleemployee …rms are primarily impacted through these dynamic incentives, and we may well anticipate that these incentives are weaker than the direct wage e¤ects of the agreements.
Therefore, we may anticipate smaller e¤ects among single-employee …rms. I again estimate the bargaining council e¤ect in two ways, using the log counts of individuals in this group and the frequency of this group among the general population. Table 10 reports the result of this analysis for each of these dependent variables, where columns represent di¤erent …xed e¤ects speci…cations (again, in addition to the spatial …xed e¤ects). Here, e¤ects for small …rms and self-employment are larger and consistently reach standard statistical signi…cance threshholds. Consistent with theory, bargaining councils reduce small …rm employment substantially, with bargaining council employment being associated with a 7-15% decline (also estimated as a .2-.38 percentage point change in the fraction of the adult population working in small …rms in that industry). This e¤ect remains very similar when we examine how spatial di¤erences vary within industries in a town or may be a case of sticky wages, or constant turnover across industries within a labor market; however, it may also be a case of low power in these estimations, and we cannot rule out similarly-sized e¤ects. Non-response in the tenure variable is not closely associated with non-response in the wage variable, and so the sample which has both of these is further reduced; examining the e¤ects of bargaining councils on tenure and wages in this sub-sample produces similar, though sometimes noisier, estimates.
town year and within an industry over time. Self employment similarly declines by 7-15%.
Large …rm employment, in contrast, does not report a consistent e¤ect. Coe¢ cients are never signi…cant and are always smaller than small …rm employment estimates. Similarly, single-employee employment is not consistently related to bargaining council agreement status, though in one speci…cation bargaining council agreements are negatively related to single employee employment rates in a precise way (though, again, even this estimate suggests a smaller e¤ect than the analogous estimates for small …rm employment and self employment).
This suggests that single-employee …rms are not driving the large e¤ects on small …rms, and that these bargaining councils are most e¤ective against small …rms, as suggested by theory.
Recalling the robustness arguments associated with the group of town-industries which represent, on average, small fractions of their industry's county-level employment, I repeat table 10 using only these observations. These results are presented in table 11. Consistent with the idea that endogeneity is minimized in this subsample, results here line up precisely with theory, with the largest e¤ects being on small …rms, smaller and marginally signi…cant e¤ects on self employment, and consistently small and insigni…cant estimates on large …rm and single-employee …rm employment. An industry in a town which represents a small fraction of it's county's employment can expect to see a 10-12% decline in small …rm employment, a 5-8% decline in self employment, and no change in it's large …rm or single-employee …rm employment relative to it's neighbors, and relative also to the variety of potential unobserved components at town, town-year, or town-industry levels. Similarly, looking at rates, .31-.41 percentage points of the population are not working in a small …rm in a given industry as a result of a bargaining council agreement.
Robustness: Border jumping
The spatial …xed e¤ects approach employed here has the limitation common to regression discontinuity studies that only local trends at the point of discontinuity are identi…ed. In the case of …rm employment, we may be concerned that …rms could relocate to a town immediately on the opposing side of the border. That is, two possible regimes would result in similar analysis: in the …rst, all towns with bargaining council agreements could be employing fewer people than their potential. This would indicate that, if we could control for all variables which determine employment except for the presence of a bargaining council agreement, the residual employment would appear as a spatial plateau. An alternate regime would be one where locally at the border, employment is depressed on the side with a bargaining council agreement and increased on the side without one, where one town's disadvantage is another's advantage. While both of these regimes indicate that …rms prefer to operate outside of the bargaining council restrictions, the former is clearly a more important issue for policy. Figure 1 15 presents a graphical illustration of these two regimes.
Here, locations on the positive side of the x-axis are presumed to have the bargaining council in place, while those on the negative side do not. If …rms are merely jumping a border at x=0, then the bargaining council's e¤ect on employment may look something like the dashed line, while if employment is being eliminated, the bargaining council's impact may more closely be represented by the solid line. Both approaches would yield similar spatial-…xed-e¤ects estimates.
A direct test of the hypothesis of border jumping (similar to Holmes 1998) can be found by reexamining level e¤ects, and asking whether log employment is di¤erent in a magisterial district if it is on the border of a bargaining council agreement than otherwise. That is, we can de…ne Border + k;ity to be equal to 1 if an industry-town-year observation is covered by a bargaining council agreement but is within k miles of another town in that industry and year which is uncovered by a bargaining council agreement and 0 otherwise. We can similarly de…ne Border k;ity equal to 1 if the observation is uncovered but within k miles of a town which is covered by a bargaining council agreement in that industry and year. Then, we can determine if border regions are di¤erent from their counterparts in the same bargaining 15 This …gure is similar to those presented in Holmes (1998). council regime by regressing
However, border regions may di¤er from interior regions for many reasons which may lead to faulty inference. Fortunately, we can use two controls in this set-up to control for spatial heterogeneity. First, the magisterial district-industry …xed e¤ects used earlier were collinear with the spatial …xed e¤ects and can still be used in this setting. These …xed e¤ects identify the coe¢ cients of interest o¤ of only time variation, so they control for any local labor market characteristics which remain constant over time. Here, we can identify any border jumping successfully presuming only that changes in local labor market characteristics are summarized by changes in bargaining council status, and not changes in border status. Moreover, this analysis allows us to look simultaneously at border e¤ects and at the e¤ect of bargaining councils on average. Second, we could consider …xed e¤ects at the District Council-Industry-Year level. As this is the level at which bargaining council decisions are made, anything about the local labor market which led to a bargaining council agreement existing or not in that year is controlled for, and border e¤ects will be identi…ed o¤ of magisterial districts within district councils which are closer to the border than other magisterial districts within the same district council. Table 12 reports the results of this analysis. We see several results in this analysis. First, there does appear to be border jumping. When a bargaining council is formed near a given town but not including that town, that town sees a large increase in employment (column 1) and small …rm employment (column 5). We similarly observe border jumping for large and small …rms using only the spatial variation, which reveal that having a bargaining council in your district council-industry-year but being closer to the edge of the bargaining council regime is associated with some ‡ight of large …rms (Column 4, row 1), and that not having a bargaining council, but being near towns that do, is associated with an increase in small …rms (column 6, row 4) However, this fact is unrelated to the bargaining council e¤ect documented in this paper, as coe¢ cients on bargaining council status are virtually unchanged by controlling for border status (columns 1,3, and 5) for overall employment, large …rms, and small …rms. This is in part becuase border regions actually have more employment on the bargaining council side as well as the non-bargaining council side, and in part because there are some fairly complicated spatial dynamics as you examine the e¤ect of 30-50 miles out from the border as opposed to being within 30 miles of it. Regardless, we can conclude two things. First, border jumping is taking place, suggesting that …rms do prefer to resettle outside of the bargaining council regime and o¤ering supporting evidence that …rms (and especially small …rms) prefer to avoid bargaining council agreements. Second, this e¤ect is not in ‡ating our estimates of the employment implications of bargaining councils.
Robustness: Average Spatial Heterogeneity
The spatial …xed e¤ect estimator compares employment in a town to the average across all towns within some radius of it. However, while introspection may provide some guidance as to the proper choice of radius, any choice will remain somewhat ad hoc. Ultimately, any spatial discontinuity study will revolve around an assumption similar to the one set forth here, where endogeneity, represented by v ity in equation 2, is assumed to be constant. Finite data sets do require that spatial bandwidths are not arbitrarily small, and researchers face a tradeo¤ between greater power through more observations per …xed e¤ect, and greater speci…city through increasingly local …xed e¤ects. This means that, at the very least, a sensitivity analysis is desirable to see whether the identi…ed results are sensitive to di¤erent assumptions on the relevant spatial bandwidth.
A pragmatic approach to identifying spatial discontinuities, then, would ask how estimates change as we change the weight which we put on observations which are at di¤erent distances in controlling for local heterogeneity. To motivate this formally, consider sev-eral sets R g (t), each of which contains towns within some radius R g of town t: Further suppose that ity = P G g=1 g ity ; that is, that the endogeneity takes the form of several spatial processes which are similar in expectation at di¤erent local radii, and where I assume
where R G (t) represents the largest radius under consideration. Each component g ity ; then, will represent the part of the endogeneity which is similar among observations at radius g; and g is the relative weight of g ity in ity : The conditional mean assumption suggests that while the overall disturbance ity may be related to estimation parameters, the fraction of the disturbance which is constant over a given radius is unrelated to the estimation parameters 16 . This suggests
and g = 1; :::; G
We are then left with
if we knew the g ; we could simply di¤erence o¤ a weighted mean
it 0 y +~ y +ũ ity
Once again, the conditional expectation of the ity is equal to the properly weighted conditional expectations of spatial heterogeneity in nearby observations, allowing consistent identi…cation of . Of course, we don't know the relative weights. However, for robustness analysis, we can choose a few rings, and solve this equation for a relatively …ne grid of all possible weights over those rings. Then, we can infer whether coe¢ cient estimates and stastical inference would be robust to a wide variety of assumptions on the spatial
heterogeneity. An alternate approach would treat the g as parameters to be estimated, for example selecting the g which minimize the sum of squared error terms. In practice, putting the full weight on the most local rings always minimizes the sum of squared errors in this exercise. In the limit, this collapses to the town-industry …xed e¤ects employed earlier, suggesting that we may prefer these estimates. In this paper, I take the robustness approach as the comparability between spatial and intertemporal estimates has been a strength of the analysis, and I illustrate that the e¤ects highlighted here are robust to a wide variety of potential spatial weights.
Weighted Spatial Fixed E¤ects: Results
In what follows, I assume there are three di¤erent rings to the heterogeneity, relevant at 5, Once again, the data prefer extremely local …xed e¤ects, again lending credence to the townindustry analysis. Regardless, it appears that small …rm e¤ects are quite robust to di¤erent forms of spatial heterogeneity, and that employment is as well if we control for town-year unobservables.
Conclusions
Bargaining council agreements are the outcome of a complex bargaining process. Their location is related to a variety of local labor market characteristics, which may lead to biases in OLS and di¤erence-in-di¤erences speci…cations. Under the assumption that labor markets are spatially continuous, this paper argues that spatial …xed e¤ects represent an improvement over traditional spatial regression discontinuity designs and determines that bargaining councils are associated with about 8-14% lower employment in a particular industry, 10-21%
higher wages, and 7-15% less employment in small …rms. We can control for potential heterogeneity by removing variation common to towns, town-years, or town-industries; whichever of these speci…cations are used result in similar (and similarly precise) point estimates. That is, an industry with a bargaining council has about 8-14% less employment than it's neigh-bors without a bargaining council. This is true if we compare it to how di¤erent industries in the same town compare to their neighbors, or if we compare how employment in that town and industry changes over time with bargaining council status. Industry-town observations which employ a relatively small fraction of the employees in their District Council experience the most severe consequences; that is, towns whose voices should receive little weight in the decision to form a bargaining council are the most severely impacted by its existence. The identi…cation assumptions of spatial continuity can be weaker for these towns -if they di¤er substantially from their neighbors in their incentives to form bargaining councils they will be unable to implement their desired bargaining council status and so these estimates are particularly compelling. Moreover, while both small and large …rms appear also to prefer avoiding these restrictions, and hence resettle on the opposite side of the border, this e¤ect is unrelated to the estimated employment e¤ect of bargaining councils.
Eight to fourteen percent is a large decrease in employment in a given industry. By means of comparison, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) estimate that French restrictions on new retail …rms led to a 3% decrease in retail employment, Besley and Burgess (2004) estimate that labor regulation reduced manufacturing employment in India by 7%, and Harrison and Scorce (2008) …nd that a 50% increase in the Indonesian minimum wage is associated with a 6% employment reduction. The bottom end of the point estimates, then, is as large as these e¤ects of labor regulation found in other contexts. However, bargaining councils cannot explain all of the unemployment problem in South Africa. 22% of employees work in two-digit industries in places with bargaining council coverage. If each of these two-digit industries were to increase employment by 6%, it would cause a 1.33 percentage point total increase in employment. Accepting the largest point estimates of 14%, the elimination of bargaining councils may result in a 3.08 percentage point increase. These e¤ects are large and should be of interest to policy makers. However, the South African unemployment situation is severe enough that a 3 percentage point increase in employment would leave South Africa with a severe unemployment problem. So while the unemployment e¤ects of these policies are as big or bigger than other estimated labor regulation e¤ects, other problems still contribute to such high unemployment in South Africa. Spatially continuous aspects of union behavior, labor market policies other than bargaining council agreements, and the other voluntary and structural stories which may lead to high unemployment levels may play an important role. Similarly, the larger small …rm e¤ects is 4-6 times larger than the di¤erence-in-di¤erences e¤ect of French entry regulations (Bertrand and Kramarz 2002) .
This policy is thus having its intended e¤ect of restricting small …rm pro…tability, in a context where the small …rms sector was already anemic. Once again, however, the small …rms sector in South Africa is so minimal that this 7-15% increase in these industries would leave small …rm employment substantially below global norms. Further research remains important to learn about the other potential contributors to this problem. Presents coe¢ cients of Bargaining Councils on log Employment (columns 1 and 2) or the Fraction of the population employed in an industry (columns 3 and 4). Rows consider di¤erent …xed e¤ects. Bargaining council status is instrumented with bargaining council eligibility, and results are conditional on spatial-industry and time …xed e¤ects, and a quartic in log population. All errors are clustered within the industry over space and time and among all industries, towns, and years in a given district council. The DC ratio sample has observations with on average, less than 20% of the employment in that industry in that district council Presents coe¢ cients of Bargaining Councils on mean log wages, and mean log wages in small or large …rms. Rows consider di¤erent …xed e¤ects. Bargaining council status is instrumented with bargaining council eligibility, and results are conditional on spatial-industry (with a radius given in the radius row) and time …xed e¤ects, and a quartic in log population. All errors are clustered within the industry over space and time and among all industries, towns, and years in a given district council. Presents coe¢ cients of Bargaining Councils on mean log wages, the fraction male, mean education, age, and log tenure, with analysis restricted to observations with at least one wage (wage sample) or tenure (tenure sample) observation. Rows consider di¤erent …xed e¤ects.
Bargaining council status is instrumented with bargaining council eligibility, and all are conditional on 50-mile spatial-industry and time …xed e¤ects, a quartic in log population, and worker composition variables. All errors are clustered within the industry over space and time and among all industries, towns, and years in a given district council.
(1) Presents coe¢ cients of Bargaining Councils on log Employment, and employment rates for di¤erent …rm size categories. Rows report the coe¢ cient on bargaining council status for speci…cations with di¤erent dependent variables, while columns indicate the level of …xed e¤ects.
Bargaining council status is instrumented with bargaining council eligibility, and results are conditional on spatial-industry and time …xed e¤ects, and a quartic in log population. All errors are clustered within the industry over space and time and among all industries, towns, and years in a given district council.
Bargaining council status is instrumented with bargaining council eligibility, and results are conditional on spatial-industry and time …xed e¤ects, and a quartic in log population. All errors are clustered within the industry over space and time and among all industries, towns, and years in a given district council. Town-industry observations with more than a 20% employment share in the district council are excluded. Regresses employment or employment by …rm size on bargaining council status, as well as border status at di¤erent border lengths, where the e¤ect of being on a border is allowed to be asymmetric by which side of the border a town is on (BC side or Not BC side). All results are conditional on time …xed e¤ects and a quartic in log population 
